We re-assess the effect of new information contained in the Hogs and Pigs Reports (HPR) focusing on the rationality of the announcements. We find that HPR preliminary numbers are irrational estimates of the final numbers and market expectations before the announcements are also irrational estimates of HPR numbers. Based on these results we modify the conventional measure of new information entering into the market (i.e., announcement -market expectation), and incorporate final estimates and the market's best forecast into the analysis. Results show modest statistical differences between the conventional and modified measures of surprise; however some economic differences, as large as 27 cents/cwt, emerged. We also find that, as expected, marketings information has a larger effect on short-term price changes and breedings information has a larger effect on long-term price changes.
Introduction
Previous research demonstrates that the hog futures market responds to information in Hogs and Pigs Reports (HPR) announcements. However, conflicting findings by Colling and Irwin (1990) , Carter and Galopin (1993) , and Colling and Irwin (1995) on the economic value of the information suggest that uncertainty persists on the magnitude and importance of the reaction. This uncertainty is heightened by findings that announcement effects in agricultural markets typically are only able to explain small portions of the variability in subsequent price changes (Carter, 1999; Garcia and Leuthold, 2004) . Part of the ambiguity and uncertainty may be related to the accuracy of the measure of surprise, or new information, to which the market responds. In futures markets, conventional procedures examine the effect on price changes of differences between market expectations and the announcement. However, this can be misleading when the announcement does not fully reflect available information, when the market responds to actual or revised final values and not just its preliminary announced value, and when market expectations are difficult to specify. Simply put, markets may be interested in the difference between the true value of a variable and its own expectations which are difficult for the analyst to appropriately quantify. In this situation, conventional procedures are biased and can underestimate the intensity of the market response to new information (Orazem and Falk, 1989) .
We examine the response of hog futures prices to different measures of surprise resulting from the HPR report. In the context of the HPR report, preliminary breeding and inventory announcements may not be rational forecasts of the final revised figures. In a similar vein, market expectations which have been measured by an average expectation of private market analysts of changes in breeding and market inventories may be incomplete if they fail to characterize accurately the vector of dynamic factors affecting market consensus. Using preliminary breeding and market inventories from the USDA HPR quarterly report, and final revised breeding and market inventories from the USDA Hogs and Pigs Final Estimates Bulletins, we investigate whether the preliminary announcements and market expectations are rational forecasts for the period 1982 to 2004. We then assess the impact of alternative measures of new information from the announcements on hog futures prices.
Related Literature
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of HPR releases on hog futures prices. For example, Miller (1979) studied the adjustments of live hog futures prices to the release of HPR farrowing information for the period 1970-1978. Using a partial adjustment model, he tests price responses to farrowing information contained in the HPR. His findings show a significant response of prices to new farrowing information, although the response is not instantaneous. The response of futures prices is slower for more distant contracts (6-7 months from delivery) than for nearby contracts (3-4 months). Hoffman (1980) and Hudson, Koontz, and Purcell (1984) find that hog futures generally react quickly to new information contained in HPRs. However, their research does not use market expectations, meaning that price responses could be associated with other sources rather than the information contained in the HPR. Colling and Irwin (1990) were the first to explicitly incorporate market expectations to assess the reaction of hog futures prices to the HPR. They use markets analysts' pre-release information to measure market expectations and quantify the effects with a two-limit tobit model to incorporate the effects of exchange imposed price limits. For the period 1981-1988, while considerable noise exists, hog prices quickly and efficiently reflect available information on inventories before the release of USDA reports, and only new information contained in the report after the release. Some weak evidence of a predictable price pattern after the USDA announcement was encountered, but profitable post-release trading strategies could not be constructed.
Using a different tact, Carter and Galopin (1993) contend that the HPR does not provide new information. They argue that the HPR has no economic value because a trader in possession of information prior to the release of the report cannot make significant risk-adjusted profits. They conclude that the market is highly efficient and able to incorporate in futures prices the information in the report prior to its release. In response, Colling and Irwin (1995) demonstrate that Carter and Galopin's findings are highly sensitive to the risk-discounting procedures used and that under a wide range of reasonable risk premiums the conclusion that HPR contains new information holds. To help further clarify this controversy, Mann and Dowen (1996) tested the effect of information arrival from HPR on both price variability and normalized trading volume. They find that the HPR does indeed provide new information to the market, with the reaction continuing to the second day after the release for nearby and distant contracts.
Several studies have also shed light on the pricing process by examining the rationality of prerelease expectations in livestock markets. Colling, Irwin, and Zulauf (1992) find that pre-release information is a strong-form rational expectation of breeding and market inventories in the HPRs. Mann and Dowen (1997) compare informational content of government (USDA) and non-government (Knight-Ridder -KR-News Service) reports and conclude that KR expectations are unbiased and efficient estimates of USDA data.
The accuracy of the government livestock reports at predicting final inventory estimates has also been investigated. Meyer and Lawrence (1988) show that for the period 1980-87 total market inventories in the HPR do not significantly differ from their predicted values. However, using an econometric model and time series comparisons, Blanton et al. (1985) find that USDA breeding inventory estimates have been overestimated. Similarly, Runkle (1991) presents strong evidence that two-quarter-ahead USDA announcements of sow farrowings intentions are not rational forecasts of actual farrowings. Later, Runkle (1992) finds that errors in USDA announcements of sow farrowing intentions have a predictable component, but that hog futures prices are efficient with respect to the farrowing announcements because they efficiently incorporate the predictable component prior to the government announcement of actual sow farrowings. Mills and Schroeder (2004) examine the rationality of the USDA Cattle on Feed (COF) reports and conclude that initial estimates are biased, but the bias is economically small. Revisions of COF estimates also are not random and exhibit persistence, suggesting when revisions are made subsequent similar types of revisions follow. Schaefer, Myers, and Koontz (2004) also test for rationality of COF, and their findings suggest that the information contained in the report is irrational with respect to final revised numbers. Further, they conclude that not recognizing the preliminary nature of the USDA announcement would have given very different results about market efficiency and the ability to predict price movements after the release of the COF report.
Hence, research suggests that the HPR contains new information which is incorporated in hog futures prices, but some controversy exists with regards to the magnitude and length of the effect, and the value of the new information. Further, there is evidence that USDA livestock reports are not unbiased estimates of revised final numbers which could influence market reaction and its measurement. When government announcements do not fully reflect available information and the market responds to the actual or revised value and not to the preliminary announcement, then estimates of its price effects will be downward biased and inconsistent because of the errors-in-variables problem (Orazem and Falk, 1989) . If this is indeed the case, this may help clarify the existing uncertainty about the nature of the market's reaction to new information and its value. Here, we evaluate the rationality of market and HPR announcements by direct comparison with USDA revised estimates, and then investigate the market's reaction to alternative surprises based on conventional and modified measures that reflect the effect of revised final estimates on price response.
Conceptual Framework
HPR announcements are released quarterly and include total market (MK) and breeding (BR) inventories. The report contains information which is released to the market after the close of trading on the announcement day. Subsequent HPR releases include revised estimates for data already published. Prior to the announcement, market expectations are based on private analysts' surveys which typically are released after the close of trading two days before the HPR is released.
The conventional procedure to measure new information from the announcement entering the market is to use the difference between the information contained in the announcement and the information known by the market prior to the release. This measure is then used to assess futures prices reaction to the new information in the market. However, when the HPR numbers are not rational estimates of actual realized values, the conventional estimator of the announcement effect may be biased and inconsistent. In turn, the wrong sign and significance of relevant parameter estimates can lead to erroneous inference regarding the effect of new information entering the market (Orazem and Falk, 1989) . Under this scenario, the specification of the surprise measure needs to be reconsidered. Extending Orazem and Falk's (1989) framework, we test the impact the release of the report has on prices using two traditional and two modified measures of surprise.
Let , a i t x be the HPR announcement estimate released at day t for BR and MK inventories, and , 1 e i t x − be the market expectation before the HPR announcement is released. Further, assume HPR estimates contain some error with respect to actual inventories and that a final revised estimate for day t, f t i x , , is released at some future day t+n. Based on this basic structure, several measures of surprise are developed.
A first measure of surprise is simply the difference between the announcement and market expectations and is the conventional representation of information contained in the HPR that is unknown to the market,
where (.) , u i t x is the unanticipated information. However, because this information might be biased with respect to final estimates, we define a second measure of surprise (i.e., conventional-final) as,
represents the modified conventional measure accounting for final estimates. The response of prices to this measure might help identify if the market is able to anticipate revisions to the initial HPR announcements. If the market has this extra information, then prices should respond to (2) ,
Under Orazem and Falk's (1989) framework, alternative surprises are based on different linear projections of the relevant breeding, marketing, and expectations variables. When the market focuses on the announcements of inventories a t i x , , the market's rational preannouncement linear forecasts are the fitted values from the regression
and the new information released to the market is,
where , '
After an announcement, the market will update its information to include , a i t x , so that the market's optimal forecast of ,
In this case new market information is,
where '
, f i t x are the fitted values from (4) (4) and (4.1), along with (4.2) must be used to derive the new information conveyed to the market by the preliminary announcement. 1
Data
Breeding and market inventories are taken from the USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports from 1982 to 2004. The reports are the result of surveys to hog producers taken by USDA and are released quarterly in March, June, September, and December after the close of trading. Inventories used in this study are totals of major states. 2 Actual breeding and market inventories are taken from the USDA Hogs and Pigs Final Estimates Bulletins, which are published approximately every five years. Final estimates differ from the above current estimates in that they make use of additional information including the Census of Agriculture, slaughter data, shipment records, imports, and exports. The final estimates inventories were matched with their corresponding current estimates so that current and actual numbers refer to the same states.
Market expectations are an average of about fifteen private market analysts expectations reported as changes in breeding and market inventories from year-ago levels. The analysts' expectations are released after the close of trading two days before the USDA report is released.
Closing hog futures prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange were collected on days one though four after the report release. Two time-horizons were defined in order to capture differences between breeding and market inventory holders. Distant futures prices are expected to react relatively more to breeding inventory announcements because breeding inventory impacts take a longer time to affect market supplies. Near futures contracts, in contrast, are expected to react to market inventory announcements because this category takes a shorter period to enter the market. The near and distant horizons were defined, respectively, as those contracts expiring 2-3 months and 7-8 months after the day of the report release. 3 Hog futures contracts underlying commodity changed from live to lean hogs in 1996. In order to develop a standardized series, prices before 1997 were transformed to lean hogs using a factor of 1.35.
Rationality Tests
Rationality means that the information released at time t equals its expected value at time t+n given all the information available at time t. For instance, the rationality condition for the information contained in the HPR's breeding (BR) and marketing (MK) inventories is,
where φ t is the set of information available on day t and implies that the estimates for BR and MK are unbiased and efficient with respect to the final revised numbers. The unbiasedness condition is tested with the following equation,
For the market expectations ( , 1 e i t
x − ), we test unbiasedness with respect to both the final estimates and announcements:
where unbiasedness implies α 0 = 0 and α 1 = 1. The tests are performed on both estimates because we are uncertain whether market expectations focus on announcements or final revised estimates. The efficiency test is a test for the presence of autocorrelation in the error terms of the USDA estimates and market expectations ((6) -(6.2)). A Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation with four lags to reflect the quarterly nature of the data is used.
Tests for rationality show that both HPR and market analysts estimates of breeding and market inventories are biased and inefficient with respect to final estimates (Table 1 ). The evidence is less strong for HPR market inventories. Also, market analysts provide biased estimates with respect to HPR announcements. The evidence of bias is strong for both breeding and market inventories and coincides with Runkle's (1992) findings for sow farrowing intentions, but contrasts with Collin and Irwin (1990) and Colling, Irwinl and Zulauf (1992) . However, analysts' expectations appear to be efficient with respect to the HPR for marketing inventories which is more consistent with previous research.
Market Reaction to New Information
The specification of the model to test the effect of the surprises on futures prices relies on institutional features of the futures markets. Hog futures contracts are subject to daily price limits of $2 per hundredweight from the previous day's closing price. When price hits that limit, trades may still take place at that price, but the free market equilibrium price is no longer observable. Table 2 shows the number of days that prices hit the limit during the sample. Approximately 40% of the prices in the sample are price limits for the first day after the announcement which might have important consequences in estimation and inference if not taken into account properly. Price limits truncate the distribution of price changes and make prices less variable. Therefore, deviations of prices from their mean values would be harder to detect and tests are biased towards non-rejection of zero coefficients. Price limits may also induce serial correlation, which would lead to the conclusion that the market is inefficient because prices do not incorporate all the available information (Kodres, 1993) . In order to overcome these problems and estimate price reactions in the presence of price limits, a two-limit tobit model is used in which prices are truncated on two sides but are allowed to vary freely between the two limits.
The tobit model is estimated for one as well as for several days after the USDA release. Tracking price response to new information over time is significant as an indication of the speed of market reaction. A significant price response on the first day after the announcement would indicate that prices react quickly to new information, whereas significant price responses on subsequent days only would indicate the degree of delay in prices to incorporating new information. The effect of one-day price changes beyond the first day after the announcement cannot be directly tested using this model because price limits appear in a sequence after the announcement day, and a limit price following a limit price would yield biased parameter estimates (Colling and Irwin, 1990) . Hence, the response of prices in subsequent days after the announcement is investigated by cumulating price differences for each day with respect to the announcement day. Because prices are permitted to move by $2 per day, the effective cumulative two-, three-and four-day price limit is $4, $6 and $8 respectively. The two-limit tobit price response model is, 
where Δ k p t * are the latent (sometimes unobserved) equilibrium futures prices in kth difference form, Δ k p t are the observed futures prices in kth difference form (Δ k p t = p t,k=k -p t,k=0 , k = 1,…, 4 is the kth day after the announcement at closing time and k = 0 is the day of the announcement at closing time), ( ) , u j i t x is the unanticipated information (i.e. measure of surprise to the market), j = 1, …, 4 are four measures of surprise defined by (1), (2), (3.1), and (4.2), j i δ are estimated coefficients, UP and LL are the upper and lower price limits respectively (UP is 2, 4, 6 and 8 for days 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively, LL is -2, -4, -6 and -8 for days 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively).
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the estimates in (7) are biased and inconsistent (Maddala and Nelson 1975; Hurd 1979) . Further, Colling and Irwin (1990) point out that heteroscedasticity has been found in futures price changes and therefore some corrective estimation may be necessary. Hence, we specify a heteroscedastic tobit model and then conduct a likelihood ratio test (LR) to assess if the difference in the log likelihood between (7) and this model is significantly different from zero. In the heteroscedastic tobit model the error term is distributed as in (8) and error variance term is assumed to be explained by the independent variables of the model. Specifically, where lnL r is the log likelihood of the restricted model (7) and lnL is the log likelihood of the heteroscedastic model represented by (8) and (8.1). LR is asymptotically distributed as χ 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions (i.e. 2, ζ BR = 0 and ζ MK = 0). 4
Hypothesis testing is performed using likelihood-ratio tests for the parameter estimates. The null hypothesis for the announcement effect is that any of the slope coefficients, δ BR or δ MK , is equal to zero. If at least one of the independent variables (breeding or market inventory) turns out to be significantly different from zero, then the information in the USDA announcement not only new to the market but is also causing a reaction in prices. Table 3 presents parameter estimates for the short-run (2-3 months) version of equation (7) and the four measures of surprise, ( ) , u j i t x , j=1…4. To help with interpretation of the effect of information on prices, we also estimate the same structure in natural logarithm differences using OLS, which permits the effects to be expressed as proportional changes (Greene, 1993) . To reflect the censoring the OLS coefficients are scaled by 1/T c where T c is the number of censored observations. The results, for the short-run (Table 4 ) and long-run (Table 5) horizons can be interpreted directly as the relationship between percentage price changes in prices and percentage changes in inventories. For example, a coefficient of -0.6 would indicate that for a 1% increase in the unexpected inventories, prices will decrease by 0.6%. 5
Consistent with the literature (Carter, 1999) , the findings suggest that the ability of the surprises to explain price changes is relatively small, but several patterns exist. The McFadden and the OLS R 2 s decrease gradually from day 1 to day 4 as one would expect due to additional information entering the market over time. Across surprise measures, these statistics are marginally higher for the linear projection measures. Similarly, the statistical significance of the estimates is higher for these two surprise measures. With regards to heteroscedasticity, the problem only emerges in day 3 and 4 with the linear projection model. Because of the modest size of the test statistics and the similarity of the coefficient to previous day's estimates, we simply provide the MLE coefficients.
A comparison of the coefficients across cumulative price changes provides important information about the reaction of prices. For example, an increase of the slope coefficients δ i in absolute value when k, the number of days, increases would indicate immediate under-reaction of prices to new inventory information. The effects of breeding and marketing information on price changes differ over time. For the near contracts, somewhat unexpectedly, on day 1 breeding inventories have a larger effect on prices than marketings for all surprises except for the conventional-final measure where breedings never enter the relationship in a statistically meaningful manner. Following day 1, the magnitude of the breedings effect appears to gradually decay, and marketings have a larger and increasing effect through day 3 on prices. The relative importance of marketing and breeding inventories on price changes is consistent with Colling and Irwin's (1990) findings, but the pattern of decay of the breedings effect and the increase of the marketings effect differs from their rather stable coefficients over the four day period. For the distant contracts, breeding inventories have large and statistically significant effects on prices for all days following the announcement, which seem to decline modestly regardless of the surprise measure. In contrast, the marketing inventory coefficients are small and never appear significantly at any conventional statistical level. 6 Overall, the pattern of price changes over time provides only modest evidence to support a contention that the hog market over-or under-reacts to new information in the HPR.
While statistically there appears to be little to separate the surprise effects, economic responses differ across surprise measures. Linear projection surprises identify generally larger market price responses than both conventional surprises. For example, on day 3 the estimate of the marketing inventory effect on prices using the conventional surprise is -0.66 while the estimate using the linear projection-final surprise is -1.08 (Table 4 ). Using a representative price of $65/cwt., the linear projection-final surprise would indicate a 27 cent/cwt larger effect on prices, due to from the price and the difference in coefficients (-1.08 and -0.66). The larger responses and higher statistical coherence identified earlier may reflect the ability of linear projection procedures to provide a more appropriate measure of surprise, allowing for a more accurate, less noisy measurement of the effect of new information.
Larger response coefficients for the linear projection-final surprise compared to the linear projection surprise provide only modest evidence that Orazem and Falk's framework, which highlights the importance of market participants' interest in the final revisions, may be slightly more consistent with the structure of market information. Despite this modest difference, the overall similarly in results for both linear projection measures makes it difficult to argue that they are not the effectively same. In Orazem and Falk's framework, these two surprises provide similar results when the announcements are rational forecasts of the final numbers. In light of the findings in Table 1 which reject rationality, the models also provide similar reflections of the effect of information on prices when expectations of final and announcements are biased in a similar manner.
Conclusions and Implications
The effect of the USDA Hogs and Pigs Report on prices is complex because the report might not provide new information to the market or might provide irrational estimates of subsequent outcomes and still affect prices. Here we evaluate the impact of the HPR on hog prices using four different surprise measures: the conventional method (announcement minus market expectations), a modified conventional method (final minus market expectations), the linear projection of the conventional method (error from the regression of announcements on market expectations), and a linear projection method that allows for revisions.
We find that HPR announcements are irrational estimates of final estimates and market expectations are also irrational estimates of HPR announcements. These findings are consistent with the tenor of Runkle's (1991) results suggesting that USDA farrowing intention estimates are biased. However, they differ from Collin and Irwin's (1990) and Colling, Irwin, and Zulauf (1992) rationality results. Modest statistical differences between the conventional and linear projection measures exist. The linear projection measures which can reduce the effect of noise on the estimate appear slightly more coherent with the data and provide modestly larger effects of changes in information on prices. Economic differences also exist between the conventional and linear projection measures, with differences in price response as large as 27 cents/cwt. emerging when comparing coefficients from the conventional measure of surprise to the linear projection measure that accounts for final estimates. Regardless of the procedure used, however, marketing inventory information has a larger and more consistent effect on near futures price changes than breeding inventory information, which has a larger effect on distant price changes. These findings are consistent with Colling and Irwin (1990) . In contrast to Colling and Irwin (1990) , we find some modest evidence of under-reaction to marketing inventories in near contracts, and over-reaction to breeding inventories in distant contracts. Finally, the rather small economic and statistical differences between both linear projection measures suggest that when similar biases in expectations and announcements relative to final estimates exist, the price effects are similar and little is gained by focusing on final revised numbers rather than announcement effects.
Several points emerge from the analysis. First, while irrationality exists, HPR reports continue to demonstrate that they provide information to the market regardless of the form that is used to measure the effect. While some differences arise, the overall message is quite robust and consistent with the past research that asserts HPR provides new information to the market. Second, the source of the irrationality in forecasting final and announced estimates is not clear, but because it emerges regardless of supply variable examined it makes sense to regard a factor such as structural or technological change in the hog industry as a likely source. If so, this would argue for the importance of allocating resources to develop a better understanding of how structural or technical change directly affects subsequent supplies. Such information might permit market analysts to generate better assessment of subsequent announcements and final estimates, and facilitate a more effective market. Finally, while we find new information does indeed explain changes in prices, consistent with Carter (1999) and Garcia and Luethold (2004) the degree of explanatory power is relatively small. This limited ability, even when we allow for different forms of surprise and market expectations, in an almost quasi-experimental market context remains a puzzle. On a positive note, this may be directing us to other types data and analyses, such as the investigation intra-day prices effects following announcements, as research strategies to better understand the effects of new information on market behavior and performance.
Endnotes 1 Alternative specifications for (4.1) using lagged values of market expectations and HPR announcements to allow for a more comprehensive specification of current market expectations were examined. Using standard rationality tests described in the text and statistical criteria, none performed better than (4.1). These findings for alternative market expectations are available from the authors. 2 The USDA definition of major states has changed because some states have experienced a great expansion of hog production, while others have become less important in the hog industry. The data set is composed of 10 states during the period 1982:2-1996:1 and 17 states during the period 1996:2-2000:4. Using a similar dataset but for the period 1981:9-1988:6, Colling and Irwin (1990) found no bias in the whole period data when compared to a subset restricted to have the same number of states.
3 Time horizons are not exactly defined because hog futures contracts do not exist for every month of the year. 4 The model for 2 t σ in (8.1) is the most general specification. We also specify a linear (i.e., . We choose the appropriate variance model based on log likelihood, AIC, and BIC measures. 5 Estimation of the Tobit model using natural logarithm differences is problematic because the upper and lower limits will vary with the level of the changes. Note: # price limit days is the number of days when prices hit the price limit, and Percentage is the proportion of those days for the sample. The total number of observations at each horizon is T=75. Days 1 to 4 are the first four trading days after the USDA announcement. Note: BR is breeding inventories, and MK is marketing inventories. The surprises are defined in the text by (1), (2) Note: BR is breeding inventories, and MK is marketing inventories. The surprises are defined in the text by (1), (2) 
